First, let us at least rejoice that Alan Gross has been
released. We can be glad for his sake that
he is back home with his family.
The rest of the news is not so good. Obama traded three Cuban spies for Gross and
a U.S. intelligence agent, and will open up financial and banking relations to
Cuba, besides authorizing travel and reopening a U.S. embassy in Havana:
American officials said the Cuban spies were swapped for a
United States intelligence agent who had been in a Cuban prison for nearly 20
years, and said Mr. Gross was not technically part of the swap, but was
released separately on “humanitarian grounds.”
In addition, the United States will ease restrictions on
remittances, travel and banking relations, and Cuba will release 53 Cuban
prisoners identified as political prisoners by the United States government.
Although the decades-old American embargo on Cuba will remain in place for now,
the president called for an “honest and serious debate about lifting” it.
The concern here is only partly the specific measures taken,
however. The context in which they are
being taken is of even greater concern.
Russian officials made two major announcements in the last
six months: that Moscow would reopen the sprawling Cold War-era listening post
near Havana, at Lourdes; and that Russian forces, now including strategic
bombers (an unprecedented feature), would resume operating from Cuba to conduct
patrols targeting the United States. Russia has, in fact, been operating intelligence collection
ships from Cuba and sending them on patrols off the southeastern U.S. coast. Meanwhile, Cuba continues to engage in an illicit arms trade
with North Korea, which facilitates the proliferation of arms to terrorist
groups and bad regimes round the world.
(See here and here as well.) Cuba also continues to be deeply involved in the repressions
inflicted by Central America’s socialist caudillos on the people of Venezuela,
Bolivia, and Nicaragua. For more than
half a century, Cuba has been one of the chief security problems of Latin
America. In the last five years, the nexus between the Castroites and
the chavistas (Chavez, his successor Maduro, Evo Morales, Daniel Ortega) has
expanded to include – increasingly overtly – Iran. Cuba’s trade relations with Iran – always,
for such nations, largely a cover for arms and intelligence cooperation – have
been growing rapidly in the last several years.
(The more warehouses and heavy machinery are ostensibly involved in the
commercial trade, the more military-strategic import it typically has. The transportation sector is one of the best
covers for military cooperation.)
China, moreover, has been cultivating increased military as
well as trade ties with Cuba in the last few years (see here and here as well),
and is reported to have intelligence operatives manning a Cuban listening post
in Bejucal.
These are some of the big, important things that have been
going on with Cuba in the time period that ought to affect our decisions about
Cuba. If we’re going to go down the path
of normalizing relations with Cuba, each and every one of these things should
be on the table. The payoff from
pursuing this course should be – explicitly, and up front – a set of verifiable
commitments from Cuba to not continue in these activities which are prejudicial
to the United States and the security of the Western hemisphere.
Obama has obtained no such promises, nor has he outlined any
program of pursuing them. Given all that
he should have been concerned about, he has simply caved and made a unilateral
gesture that will benefit Cuba, but not the U.S.
In fact, Obama’s opening of travel and financial relations
to Cuba will actively harm the U.S. The
first people on the plane to the U.S. from Cuba will be spies – and spies not
just for Cuba but for Russia, China, and Iran.
The difference now will be the casual ease with which they can gain
access to the United States by posing as mere Cuban businessmen, tourists, and
workers on visas.
Opening financial relations with Cuba will create an even
bigger vulnerability. Cuba will have her
feet in both worlds: the global
financial network in which the U.S. and our allies set the rules, and – beyond
doubt – the alternative network which Russia is currently laboring to
assemble. (See more about how this fits
in with Russia’s strategic intentions here, from an interview given by Russian
Defense Minister Dmitry Rogozin.)
Cuba is too dependent on Russia to avoid participating in
the alternative financial network, and presumably, as long as the Castroites
are in power, they will want to.
Members of the “BRICS” bloc might or might not be interested
in joining Russia’s network; if some do so, the U.S. and allies like Japan and
the EU will be faced with a serious, high-profile security policy dilemma. When North Korea joins Russia’s network, on
the other hand, we can rejoice that our banking system is not connected to
Pyongyang to begin with.
But it would be easy to minimize the concern Western
observers would feel about little Cuba being a nexus between the two
networks. The New York Times editorial
posture, for example, would no doubt dismiss the obvious concerns as
“conspiracy theory,” at least until some American politician’s family member
got caught with taxpayer-assisted commercial interests that were financing arms
shipments to Hezbollah, ISIS, or Boko Haram through the Cuban financial-network
nexus.
It’s going to be tough enough navigating a world in which
Russia operates a separate international financial network, to which some
nations will have an interest in belonging.
Everywhere there exists a nexus between the networks – a nexus that by
definition is outside the control of the Western allies – the SWIFT
participants will have to worry about vulnerabilities to shenanigans and
skullduggery. (Indeed, the very
survivability of the Russian network is likely to depend at times on exploiting
the opportunities in such a nexus.)
But we already know what the Castros’ Cuba is. We know that the vulnerabilities created by
this nexus in Cuba are inevitable. Now
is the dumbest possible time to fling the door open to networked financial
transactions with Cuba.
What can Congress do about this? Can it rein Obama in, at least on the matter
of opening the banking system to Cuba?
That’s a good question. Congress
might be able to pass veto-proof legislation, but forcing Obama to implement it
is another matter. I don’t see the
courts settling this one; foreign-policy powers are one of the least conclusive
realms of constitutional law.
Obama has laid an egg, on several levels, and we’re going to
see it hatch. The Pandora’s Box his
policies are opening looks minor and unserious only to the complacent eye: the
eye that knows no history, and thinks the halcyon summer of the last 25 years
is the normal state of mankind. It’s
not.
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DESDE MIAMI...SIN PATRIA PERO SIN AMO LOS GUSANOS VE HICIERON MARIPOSAS QUE VUELAN LIBRES |
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